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South Africa’s relations with China have seen a significant 
growth over the last 15 years—much in line with China’s 
engagement in the rest of the African continent. While in 1992 
Sino-South African trade totalled US$ 14 million, it had grown to 
US$ 26.6 billion in 2010, making China South Africa’s biggest 
trading partner. South Africa is one of the top ten recipients of 
China’s Official Finance to Africa and from 2000 to 2011 and 
received an estimate of US$ 2.3 billion.  
In 2012, China upgraded South Africa to the relationship of 
‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ – a title China has 
designated to indicate a deepening of political, economic and 
trade co-operation, which includes a promotion of trade balance 
and value-added activities on the South African side.  
Trade patterns between South Africa and China are comparable 
with Chinese relations with other African states: China imports 
mostly raw material from South Africa, while South Africa 
imports mostly manufactured goods from China. The quality of 
relations with South Africa, however, are different in that South 
Africa is also a source of investment in China, often via the 
Special Administrative Region Hong Kong (see box 1). South 
African investment into China is dominated by large companies 
including Naspers (media), SABMiller (breweries), and Sasol 
(chemical); there is no South African FDI to speak of in Taiwan.  
In 2011, the Development Bank of South Africa and the China 
Development Bank signed a financial cooperation agreement for 
US$ 2.5 billion, the two banks will invest in mining, 
infrastructure, transport, communication, energy, and 
agricultural projects in South Africa.  
From Taiwan to the PR China: Economic and social shifts 
Clearly eclipsed by economic relations with mainland China, 
Taiwan (officially: Republic of China) has nevertheless remained 
a significant destination for South African exports, the vast bulk 
of which comprised of raw and semi-processed materials such 
as coal, iron and aluminium. In 2011, Taiwan ranked as South 
Africa’s 15th largest export destination. South Africa also 
remains an export market for Taiwan, ranking as its 29th most 
important market. Like many European, American and East 
Asian economic relationships with South Africa, the economic 
advantage falls on the Taiwanese side, insofar as the bulk of 
materials leaving South Africa have little value added while its 
imports – comprising mainly of computer components, textiles 
garments and machinery – produce greater value for Taiwan. 
Thus, even while the overall trade balance falls in South Africa’s 
favour, the ‘commodities out—manufactured goods in’ pattern 
detracts from this figure. The overall trade pattern has declined 
since the 1980s. For instance, while in 1985, South Africa 
accounted for 2 per cent of imports and exports for Taiwan, 
today it accounts for only 0.3 per cent.   
A major shift in the relationship has been a substantial decrease 
in FDI which Taiwanese enterprises provided to South Africa in 
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of a South African foreign policy accused of being beholden to China.  
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the 1980s and 1990s. At the time, as labour costs rose in 
Taiwan, companies shifted their manufacturing base abroad. 
Previously, apartheid South Africa and Taiwan developed robust 
political as well as economic relations, based on shared anti-
communist, nationalist ideologies and pariah status within the 
international community. Apartheid South Africa became a 
destination for Taiwanese investors, who had invested over US$ 
100 million by 1987. The majority of this was centred in the 
textile industry at the fringes of the apartheid ‘homelands’, i.e. 
close to available ‘cheap’ labour. This was paralleled by a 
population shift, with about 50,000 Taiwanese migrating to 
South Africa during the peak of their influence.  
The political and economic shifts in South Africa in the mid-
1990s had a significant impact on these trends. While it is 
commonly assumed that the Taiwanese disinvestment 
and migration from South Africa in the late 1990s was 
due to the governments political de-recognition of the 
ROC, there is little evidence for this claim. During the 
transition period, President Mandela, had assured 
Taiwanese investors that they would be able to 
continue their businesses. Rather, socio-economic 
shifts following the fall of apartheid were the main 
factors for the exodus. The increased power of labour 
unions and subsequent wage increase demands 
allegedly contributed to 70 per cent of investors 
leaving; another 30 per cent left due to an  increase in 
crime threats to physical safety (see Diagram 1).  
In tandem with this, South Africa witnessed a 
subsequent increase in mainland Chinese immigrants, 
whose number leapt from 50,000 in 1999 to an 
estimated of over 350,000 today. A large number of 
the more recent Chinese migrants were, unlike the 
wealthier Taiwanese manufacturers, petty traders for 
whom union engagement is not relevant and who were also 
seemingly more willing to shoulder the risk of crime.  
South Africa’s natural resources, market size and political 
stability attract Chinese businesses. Chinese FDI to South Africa 
sticks out in that it focuses strongly on services (not least so: 
finance) and manufacturing (e.g. vehicles and household 
appliances) and in that they are often joint ventures in the 
mining sector. The latter is a function of a policy of ‘black 
economic empowerment’ in South Africa which requires ‘black-
owned enterprises’ as business partners. This investment 
consists predominantly of large state-owned and private 
mainland companies who have invested in commodities, finance 
and telecoms. Medium-sized enterprises of the Taiwan variety, 
however, are largely absent amongst Chinese investors.  
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Diagram 1: Estimates of Chinese/Taiwanese population in South Africa  
Box 1: Hong Kong in South Africa’s economic Asia link 
The hand-over of Hong Kong from British colonial rule to 
becoming a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China was 
the official reasoning for changing diplomatic recognition from 
Taipei to Beijing. Trade and investment often goes through 
Hong Kong, which consequently features quite substantially in 
trade statistics; Macau is negligible (see Diagram 2).  
Hong Kong has the best accessibility for South African business 
in terms or economic openness, a similar legal and institutional 
setting based on the British model, and the use of English as the 
official language. Financial transfers through Hong Kong are 
substantially easier than via mainland China, which still 
exercises currency controls, and the SAR lends itself to be a 
logistical hub as it is a free port. One soft factor in the decision 
for Hong Kong as a business hub presumably is also the quality 
of life in a British-influenced, social club-dominated setting.  
While Taiwan, since the 1990s, might offer a good quality of 
life, cultural (not least: language) factors and, political quarrels 
with Beijing, make it a far less obvious choice when establishing 
a regional base for business. Increasing pressure on Hong 
Kong’s position could come from further liberalisation in China, 
such as the launch of a free trade zone in Shanghai, and also 
infrastructure expansion in neighbouring Guangdong province.  
However, investors often still see Hong Kong as the preferred 
destination to establish their business headquarters for the 
above reasons. Hong Kong SAR inter alia houses Naspers’ Asian 
investment (media), SAB Miller (breweries), Sappi Trading (pulp 
and paper), Sasol Chemical, and Standard Bank Asia (finance). 
Numerous small businesses are also to be found. The South 
African Consulate in Hong Kong hosts (local) staff of the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), who engage in 
business promotion and networking activities.  
Source: Compiled data by the author 
Diplomacy  
Official relations between Pretoria and Beijing are close, which 
affords numerous high level visits, trade delegations, party-to-
party meetings and joint membership of new global bodies, 
such as the BRICS group and the G20. State visits are 
frequently accompanied by business delegations, which 
facilitates networking with key-decision-makers. The effective 
promotion of business is also conducted via party-to-party 
meetings (between the Chinese Communist Party and the 
African National Congress).   
Chinese and South African regional provinces have been seeking 
ways of deepening their relations through sister-city 
relationships (replacing earlier sister city relationships between 
Taiwan and South Africa). Since 1998, Beijing and Gauteng, 
Shandong Province and the Western Cape, and Shanghai and 
KwaZulu-Natal have established twinning relationships. At 
China’s behest, South Africa joining the BRICS grouping has also 
strengthened the relationship. As a reflection of China’s 
engagement with Africa as a whole, an immense amount of 
energy and money is spent on promoting Chinese ‘soft power’, 
including Confucius Institutes, scholarships, conferences, media 
promotion, and so forth.  
Clearly overshadowed by Pretoria-Beijing relations, and despite 
South Africa’s de-recognition, Taiwan has maintained a set of 
institutions which actively pursue bi-lateral trade with South 
Africa. This includes official bodies, such as the Economic 
Division of the Taipei Liaison Office, Taiwan’s official delegation 
to South Africa. Taiwanese institutions in South Africa also 
comprises quasi non-state actors such as the Taiwan External 
Trade Development Council (TAITRA) who act as indirect 
promotional arms for the government. The Bureau of Foreign 
Trade designs trade policies which are implemented by TAITRA; 
90 per cent of TAITRA’s budget comes from the Bureau. The 
Bank of Taiwan, which maintains a branch in Johannesburg, has 
entrusted TAITRA with promoting trade and economic growth. 
The institution engages in trade exhibitions such as the 
Southern African International Trade Exhibition (SAITEX), where 
14 Taiwanese companies producing high-tech products, 
including solar water heaters also participated.  
Diagram 2: SA exports to parts of China  
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Box 2:  China –Taiwan Relations  
Prior to the 1980s, Chinese economic engagement with Taiwan 
was politically un-wanted. Maoist China forbade trade with Tai-
wan; similarly, a nationalist Taiwanese government forbade 
trade with Mainland China. With Deng Xiaoping’s rise to the 
Chinese leadership in 1979 and the introduction of market re-
forms, a policy of “peaceful reunification” arose in conjunction 
with indirect trade between the two territories. By the time Tai-
wan had lifted martial law in 1987, trade, which was still offi-
cially banned, had reached a volume of US$ 1.5 billion. Taipei 
tried to further limit trade but it proved ineffective; lured by 
China’s vast market and sharing common language and cultural 
affinities, business opportunities were ripe: big business lobbied 
Taiwanese politicians and smaller companies set up offshore 
companies to do business with China. By 2006, cross-Strait 
trade had reached US$ 100 billion.  
Although there were no official travel links during this period, in 
the same year 4.4 million Taiwanese visited China; 600,000 
businessmen and women travelled to and investments in the 
mainland; and half a million Taiwanese already lived in Shang-
hai and adjacent areas. By 1997, mainland China was the sec-
ond largest market for Taiwanese exports and by 2001, the 
first. Both entities became members of General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later, in 2002, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) - Taiwan signing as ‘Chinese Taipei’.  
With the election of Taiwanese president Ma Yin-Jeou in 2008, 
relations have further improved. Ma is member of the National-
ist Party (Guomindang) and succeeded pro-independence presi-
dent Chen Shui-bian. The Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA), signed in 2010, aims to reduce tariffs and 
commercial barriers; it is expected to boost bilateral trade by 
US$ 110 billion. Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on the 
mainland has been more successful in integrating Taiwan and 
China than any other measure taken since their split in 1949.  
From this perspective, Taiwan’s economic engagement with 
South Africa is perfectly acceptable to the PRC – as long as it 
excludes state recognition. In fact, many Taiwanese companies 
whose goods are sold in Africa, run their manufacturing bases 
in China. This highlights an economic pragmatism shared on all 
three sides; this situation looks set to increase as Taiwan aban-
dons its pursuit of trying to win over foreign states to officially 
recognise its sovereignty.   
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa  
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Despite insisting on a ‘One China’ policy, Beijing’s own relations 
with Taiwan are pragmatic and much more intense nowadays 
than, say, a decade back (see box 2). 
Yet, de-recognition by South Africa has a significant impact on 
Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. Since South Africa’s switch to the 
PRC, meetings with Taiwanese officials have been down-graded 
in status, with meetings at Director-General rather than 
Ministerial level. This delays the process of implementing 
policies, and also prevents access by Taiwanese officials to key 
decision-makers in the South African government.  
Conclusions: Missed opportunities?  
South African handling of the ‘One China’ policy is reflective of a 
general foreign policy shift witnessed in post-apartheid South 
Africa. During the Mandela administration, relations with other 
nations were motivated by a rather ‘idealistic’ philosophy in 
which South Africa was to championed human rights and 
democracy. This subsequently shifted toward a more 
developmental agenda in which economic interests have come 
to the fore. This tacit shift to a more realpolitik-driven agenda 
has occurred in tandem with the global phenomenon of China’s 
rise and its particular economic focus on the African continent.  
In a geopolitical and global scheme, recognising the PRC can 
thus be understood as a ‘normalisation’ of South African foreign 
policy. It is unthinkable to not have relations with one of the 
great economic and political powers of the 21st century. All 
OECD countries and most other African states have diplomatic 
relations with Beijing since the 1970s. Many industrialised 
countries also maintain a liaison office in Taipei, despite 
recognition of the ‘One China’ policy, similar to South Africa.  
The low-key economic pragmatism which is evident between 
China, Taiwan and South Africa is reflective of an economic 
rationality which exists in spite of the charged political 
dimensions of the relationship. Within this broader picture, 
however, it appears that a culture of self-censorship amongst 
South African political elites has emerged, in which they tend to 
steer clear of any issue that might raise eyebrows in Beijing. 
This adds to a broader critique of South African foreign policy as 
over-compensating toward China, exemplified in the recent 
failure of the South African government to grant the Dalai Lama 
a visa, which was widely believed to be a result of pressure 
from Beijing. It is significant that in the case of economic 
engagement with Taipei, pressure does not appear to be 
exerted from Beijing. The PRC embassy is quite open about not 
interfering in Taiwanese business interests in South Africa. 
Rather, it appears that South Africa’s eagerness to receive an 
economic windfall from China results in South Africa (overly) 
anxious not to displease China. Thus, following a ‘better safe 
than sorry policy’, South African political and business elites 
often choose not to exploit potential business and investment 
opportunities with Taiwan.   
Recommendations 
It is very rational that South African investors target mainland 
China’s population of 1.3 billion; Taiwan’s 23 million are 
obviously a minor addendum to this vast market. However, the 
structure of trade remains an issue of concern. The South 
African side, not least so The Department of Trade and Industry 
and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 
need to engage in a coordinated manner in order to work on the 
promotion of exports of added-value (manufactured) goods to 
China. Furthermore, shifting investments in South Africa to more 
medium sized enterprises should be a goal. This is work mostly 
aimed at the levels of domestic policies and the investment 
climate — and is a task in the greater African context.    
Political relations with Beijing are excellent and provide a basis 
from which to foster South African (economic) interests in a 
diplomatic manner. Beijing is relatively nonchalant regarding 
economic relations with Taiwan if it does not touch on 
diplomatic recognition, hence South Africa need not be afraid to 
develop its economic links with Taipei. Taiwan has largely 
abandoned its earlier policy of seeking diplomatic recognition 
and its current strategy is one with an emphasis on economic 
diplomacy. This opens policy space that should be used. 
Engagement with Taiwan - alongside continuous and intensified 
engagement with Beijing – would be complicit with South 
Africa’s foreign policy of economic development and should be 
situated within a larger strategy of taking advantage of the 
economic opportunities in China, but also throughout the East 
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